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Abstract Anger has traditionally been associated with aggression and antagonistic
behavior. A series of studies revealed that experiences of third-party anger (anger
experienced when observing that harm is done to someone) can also lead to prosocial
behavior. More specifically, three studies, hypothetical scenarios as well as a behav-
ioral study, revealed that third-party anger can promote compensation of the victim.
The results also showed a preference for such prosocial behaviors over antagonistic
behaviors. We conclude that behaviors stemming from anger, whether antagonistic or
prosocial, are reactions to inequity, albeit determined by the constraints of the situation.
Keywords Third-party anger · Prosocial · Compensation · Punishment · Inequity
1 Introduction
Anger is one of the most frequently experienced emotions (e.g., Schimmack and Diener
1997). It is elicited by events that are unpleasant or undesired, such as situations of
goal obstruction, injustice, or unfairness (e.g., Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004;
Frijda 1986, 1987; Kuppens et al. 2003; Scherer 1993). Because of its prevalence and
because the experience of anger typically involves negative situations and feelings, it
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is not surprising that this emotion has long been seen as one of the most exemplary
negative emotions (e.g., Averill 1982; Berkowitz 1990; Izard 1991; Russell 1991).
Interestingly, the behaviors that angry people display appear to be diverse and
not so unambiguously negative. Anger is an approach-motivated emotion (Carver
and Harmon-Jones 2009) that brings forth an effort to remove the violation of what
‘ought’ to be (Frijda 1986). Studies have suggested that this approach motivation
can take the form of aggressive, punitive, and antagonistic behaviors (e.g., Bougie
et al. 2003; Darley and Pittman 2003; Fischer and Roseman 2007; Lemay et al. 2012;
Lotz et al. 2011a; Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009; Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Rimé
2009; Roseman et al. 1994; Coillie and Mechelen 2006; Wetzer et al. 2007). Although
this classical view of anger clearly dominates the literature, there are mixed findings
suggesting positive outcomes as well. Specifically, there is some evidence that anger
can promote positive behaviors such as social sharing, compensation to a victim, and
helping the disadvantaged (e.g., Iyer et al. 2007; Lotz et al. 2011a, b; Wakslak et al.
2007).
Still, research showing a direct relation between anger and prosocial or helping
behaviors is lacking (for a review, see Van Doorn et al. 2014). In this paper we exam-
ine the effect of anger on subsequent prosocial behavior of third-parties and seek to
explain both antagonistic and prosocial consequences of anger in terms of equity-
repair concerns. Before we describe the rationale of our studies it is useful to note that
in this article we use the term prosocial behavior to refer to behavior aimed at helping
a victim in order to restore equity. We do not propose that anger leads to a general
tendency to act prosocially to anyone or at any time. In fact, as we explain below, we
believe it is crucial to differentiate between first- and third-party anger to understand
the various behavioral expressions of anger.
2 First-party and third-party anger
We can experience anger both as a result of the harm done to ourselves (first-party
anger) and as a result of the harm done to someone else (third-party anger). Although
first- and third-party anger might feel similar, there are reasons to believe that the
behaviors that follow from these emotional experiences are different. With this we
do not suggest that there are necessarily two different forms of anger; instead we
argue that different situations offer different behavioral constraints and affordances
for the expression of anger’s approach-motivation (cf., Frijda and Zeelenberg 2001).
For example, being angry after unjustly receiving a disadvantageously low amount of
money (first-person victim) could lead to the restoration of equity by punishing the
perpetrator who distributed the money. Being angry because someone else unjustly
received a disadvantageously low amount of money (third-party observer) could lead
to the restoration of equity by punishing the perpetrator, but also by compensating the
‘victim’. Thus, observers of inequity (‘third parties’) have a wider range of restorative
behaviors at their disposal than victims of inequity do. After all, victims can rarely
compensate themselves (cf., Feldman Hall et al. 2014).
It has already been shown that various prosocial behaviors aimed at restoring equity
may occur in third-party situations. For example, Lotz et al. (2011b) found that people
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generally compensated more than they punished in third-party situations. Furthermore,
Leliveld et al. (2012) found that people who scored high on dispositional empathy
had a preference for compensating victims instead of punishing perpetrators in these
situations. Though these studies have shown that people both compensate and pun-
ish, the question is what drives people to act prosocially in triadic situations? We
have reason to believe that anger, which has hitherto been associated largely with
third-party punishment (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2002; Lotz et al. 2011b), can also
motivate third-party prosocial acts. Both punishment of a perpetrator and compen-
sation of a victim can act as a means to the end of restoring unjust or inequitable
relations (e.g., Frijda 2004; Van Doorn et al. 2014). We believe that in interpersonal
situations the general concern of anger, namely goal blockage (e.g., Berkowitz and
Harmon-Jones 2004; Kuppens et al. 2003), translates into a concern for equity (e.g.,
Stillwell et al. 2008). This would imply that the behaviors following from anger are
aimed at restoring equity. In first-party situations this is often done in an antagonistic
manner; however, in third-party situations equity can also be restored in a prosocial
manner.
Given that there are multiple ways to right certain wrongs in third-party situa-
tions, it is surprising that in experimental research punishment has often been the
only option given to participants (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Fehr and Gächter
2002; Nelissen and Zeelenberg 2009). In the few examples in which the research
included prosocial options, moral outrage (anger provoked by the perception that a
moral standard has been violated; see Batson et al. 2007) correlated substantially
with both participants’ assignment of perpetrator punishment and victim compensa-
tion (Darley and Pittman 2003; Lotz et al. 2011a, b). In a similar vein, Vitaglione
and Barnett (2003) found that empathic anger was positively related to both helping
a victim and punishing a perpetrator; Montada and Schneider (1989) and Wakslak
et al. (2007) found that moral outrage correlates with prosocial activities such as
donating money, signing petitions, and supporting social projects in favor of the
disadvantaged; and Iyer et al. (2007) suggested that anger aimed at the ingroup
predicted compensation to an outgroup. Although all these findings are suggestive
of a relationship between third-party anger and prosocial behavior, none of these
studies included manipulations of anger. It is important to identify causal effects in
order to predict (prosocial) behavior stemming from anger. On the basis of the find-
ings by Lotz et al. (2011b), we might even expect angry people to prefer victim
compensation over punishment of a perpetrator as a way of restoring equity. In com-
pensation, the victim is helped out of his/her disadvantageous position; punishing the
perpetrator may also restore justice, but this does not take away the harm done to
the victim. Thus, compensation of a victim seems to be a more positive approach.
Moreover, victim compensation is consistent with the do-no-harm principle (Baron
1995).
We further expect compensation to be a direct result of the anger, which is inde-
pendent from the empathic concerns that may be triggered simultaneously (Leliveld
et al. 2012). Some initial support for this expectation can already be found in the
experiment by Lotz et al. (2011b), who found that visibility mattered for empathy:
the goal of empathy is to comfort someone, but if the victim does not know about
the unfair allocation there is no one to comfort. Visibility, however, did not matter
123
588 J. van Doorn et al.
for anger, which correlated with the restoration of injustice in all cases. Accord-
ing to Blader and Tyler (2002), justice theory suggests that we feel concerned even
when a loathsome person for whom we feel little empathy is the victim of injus-
tice. Although anger was not explicitly mentioned or examined in this relationship,
the emotion appraisal literature shows that injustice is indeed an important elic-
itor of anger (Mikula et al. 1998). Montada and Schneider (1989) even showed
that moral outrage was a stronger predictor for prosocial behavior than sympathy,
a construct very much related to empathy (Eisenberg and Fabes 1990). Thus, the
effects of anger and empathy on compensation are expected to be independent of one
another.
In the anger literature one finds several terms referring to anger stemming from
outcomes that are not for oneself. We use the term third-party anger as an umbrella
term for all these forms of anger. For example, Batson et al. (2007) differentiate
between moral outrage (anger provoked by the perception that a moral standard
has been violated), personal anger (anger one might feel when one’s own inter-
ests are thwarted), and empathic anger (when interests of the cared-for other have
been thwarted). First-party anger is what Batson et al. would call personal anger,
and third-party anger is what they would call empathic anger when it concerns
cared-for others such as friends, and moral outrage when it concerns strangers.
As argued before, we do not believe that the experiences of anger are differ-
ent between first-party or third-party anger, but rather its behavioral consequences
are because the specific situations allow for different solutions. Studies that did
concern behavioral consequences of moral outrage (O’Mara et al. 2011; Mon-
tada and Schneider 1989; Wakslak et al. 2007) or empathic anger (Vitaglione and
Barnett 2003) all involved situations that we would call third-party anger situa-
tions.
3 The current studies
We report here three studies using different methods to investigate the behavioral con-
sequences of third-party anger. All methods have proven to be useful for studying
emotions and their consequences in previous research. Of course, each method on its
own has its idiosyncratic strengths and weaknesses. As a set, though, we suggest that
these different methodologies inform us about the potential prosocial consequences
of anger. Study 1 provided a first experimental test of whether experiences of anger
(via an autobiographical recall) spillover to prosocial behavior in a third-party sit-
uation. This study shows that activating anger increases willingness to compensate
a victim of unfairness, and that angry people are willing to compensate more than
to punish. This study also shows that these effects are independent of trait anger
and trait empathy. Study 2 extended this finding by illustrating that angry partici-
pants preferred compensation to punishment when forced to choose between the two
responses. Finally, Study 3 employs an economic game with real payoffs attached
to provide a direct measure of behavior. The results suggest that unfairness triggers
anger, which causes third-party interventions despite a direct cost to decision mak-
ers.
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4 Study 1
4.1 Method
1Dutch University students (27 males, 94 females, one unspecified, Mage = 20.37,
SD = 2.11) were randomly assigned to the anger or control condition. Participants
completed an autobiographical recall task, describing a situation in which they felt
angry (anger condition) or describing a normal day of the week (control condition).
Recalling a situation in which a certain emotion was experienced reactivates the emo-
tion and thereby also the motivational tendencies associated with that emotion (e.g.,
Strack et al. 1985). Furthermore, such recall tasks have been effectively used in pre-
vious studies on the behavioral consequences of emotions in experimental economic
games (e.g., De Hooge et al. 2008; Martinez and Zeelenberg 2015). Participants first
indicated how much anger, happiness, shame, regret, sadness, and guilt they felt (1 =
not at all, 5 = very strongly) in that situation. They next continued with an unrelated
task in which they read the following scenario (translated from the original Dutch):
Imagine: You observe a game played by two players, named Mark and Rick.
Mark and Rick are playing a game in which e100 needs to be divided. Mark
gets to decide how to divide this money between himself and Rick. Rick has no
influence on the division of the money. Mark decides to give Rick e40 and to
keep e60.
Then, participants read that they themselves own e50, and that there are three
options to use that money: compensate Rick (every euro that they used for compensa-
tion would increase Rick’s amount with e3), punish Mark (every euro that they used
for punishment would decrease Mark’s amount withe3) and/or keep the money them-
selves (cf. Leliveld et al. 2012). Participants filled in the amount of money spent on
punishing Rick, compensating Mark, and the amount they kept for themselves (which
needed to add up to e50).2
Participants then completed the 7-item empathic concern scale (α = 0.83; Davis
1983, 1994, as used in Leliveld et al. 2012), and a trait anger scale based on a shortened
version of the trait anger subscale of the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (α =
0.87; STAXI; Spielberger 1988).3 These additional scales were included for control
1 We report all data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures in the studies. The order of
measures reported in the method sections is the same as the order of measures in the original questionnaire
provided to participants. Studies 1 and 2 were part of a larger testing session. There were no gender effects
in any of the studies. When there was an inequality of variances when testing differences between means
using t tests, corrected degrees of freedom are reported throughout the article. Throughout the article we
use Cohen’s d for effect sizes of t tests. In case of a paired samples t test, we used the following formula
to calculate Cohen’s d: t
√
1/n.
2 For exploratory reasons, we also asked participants to motivate their reason for choosing punishment
and/or compensation and/or keeping the money themselves in Study 1 and Study 2. The most prevalent rea-
son for choosing punishment or compensation was that participants felt that was “the fairest/equitable thing
to do”, or that they could use the money themselves when choosing neither punishment nor compensation.
However, we do not describe these results in detail here.
3 Items included “I am easily frustrated”, “I have a fiery temper”, “I am quicktempered”, “I am a hotheaded
person”, “I am easily annoyed”.
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Table 1 Study 1: anger and monetary division means (and standard deviations) as a function of emotion
condition
Condition
Anger (n = 63) Control (n = 59)
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI
Anger 3.67 (0.92)a [3.44, 3.90] 1.29 (0.74)b [1.09, 1.48]
Compensation 4.49 (6.12)a [2.95, 6.03] 2.51 (3.31)b [1.65, 3.37]
Punishment 2.46 (4.18)a [1.41, 3.51] 1.80 (2.95)a [1.03, 2.56]
Self 43.05 (7.98)a [41.04, 45.06] 45.69 (5.23)b [44.33, 47.06]
Anger scores could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Higher scores indicate higher amounts
of euros used to punish/compensate. Means with a different superscript are significantly different with
ts > 2.20, ps < 0.03
reasons because these traits might influence the relation between state anger and com-
pensation or punishment (e.g., Deffenbacher et al. 1996; Leliveld et al. 2012; Vitaglione
and Barnett 2003). Finally, participants were thanked, debriefed, and received e8 or
course credit for their participation.
4.2 Results
The results are displayed in Table 1. The other emotion means are in the Appendix.
Participants in the anger condition reported more anger than participants in the con-
trol condition. Participants in the anger condition reported more anger than all other
emotions.
Monetary division In the anger condition, out of 63 participants 21 did not use
any money for compensation or punishment, 1 only punished, 14 only compensated,
and 27 punished and compensated. In the control condition, out of 59 participants
23 did not use any money for compensation or punishment, 4 only punished, 17 only
compensated, and 15 punished and compensated. Thus, a total of 78 participants (64%)
engaged in at least one justice response. An ANOVA on the amount of euros spent on
compensation revealed a significant effect of condition, F(1, 120) = 4.86, p = 0.029,
η2p = 0.04. Participants in the anger condition gave more money to compensate Rick
than participants in the control condition, but they did not punish Mark more than
control participants, F(1, 120) = 1.02, p = 0.316, η2p = 0.01. Furthermore, participants
induced with anger spent more money on compensation than punishment, t(62) =
2.37, p = 0.021, d = 0.30. This difference was not significant for control participants,
t(58) = 1.58, p = 0.119, d = 0.21.4
4 There were three extreme outliers (data points that are more extreme than Q1 − 3 * IQR or Q3 + 3 *
IQR) on the compensation and punishment measures, which were all in the anger condition. We chose not
to delete these outliers, as we judged these responses as likely and valid, especially because these cases
appeared in the same condition and might be considered as more intense reactions to the anger manipulation.
However, when deleting these three cases we see a slight adjustment in one of the effects: The effect of
condition on compensation becomes marginally significant (F(1, 117) = 3.14, p = 0.079, η2p = 0.04).
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Traits The scores on empathic concern (M = 3.40, SD = 1.84) and on trait anger (M =
6.71, SD = 5.44) did not differ between conditions, revealing that the manipulation did
not influence the trait measures. Regression analyses showed that empathic concern
was related only to the amount of money participants used for compensation, β =
0.20, t(120) = 2.17, p = 0.032, and not for punishment, β = 0.15, t(120) = 1.63, p =
0.106. Trait anger was related only to the amount of money participants used to punish,
β = 0.23, t(121) = 2.58, p = 0.011, and not to compensation, β = 0.05, t(121) = 0.57, p =
0.572.
When entering empathic concern as a covariate in the ANCOVA with Condition as
an independent variable and compensation as dependent variable, condition remained
significant, F(1, 118) = 4.56, p = 0.035, η2p = 0.04. In addition, when entering trait
anger as a covariate in an ANCOVA with Condition as an independent variable and
punishment as dependent variable, the results for Condition remain non-significant,
F(1, 119) = 0.64, p = 0.427, η2p = 0.01. Thus, controlled for the traits empathic
concern and anger, state anger still motivated participants to use higher amounts of
money to compensate the victim as compared to participants not experiencing state
anger.
4.3 Discussion
This study found that inducing anger in participants resulted in an increased amount
of money they assigned for compensation. Furthermore, within the anger condition,
more money was spent on compensation than on punishment. Put differently, partici-
pants who have been induced with anger kept less money for themselves than control
participants, and spent more on compensating the victim rather than punishing the per-
petrator. These effects occurred independently from participants’ empathic concern.
Although Study 1 provided support for a causal link from anger to compensation,
it has not yet been shown that compensation is actually the preferred response that
follows third-party anger. Study 2 therefore tests which response, compensation or
punishment, angry people prefer when they are forced to choose. We used a more
unfair version of the scenario from Study 1 as an anger manipulation.
5 Study 2
5.1 Method
Dutch university students (61 males, 130 females, one unspecified; Mage = 21.06, SD
= 2.62) were randomly assigned to the inequity or equity condition. Participants in the
inequity condition read the following scenario (translated from the original Dutch):
Imagine: You observe a game played by two players, named Mark and Rick.
Mark and Rick are playing a game in which e100 needs to be divided. Mark
gets to decide how to divide this money between himself and Rick. Rick has no
influence on the division of the money. Mark decides to give Rick e20 and to
keep e80.
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Table 2 Study 2: anger means (and standard deviations) and percentages of monetary division chosen as
a function of emotion condition
Condition
Inequity (n = 95) Equity (n = 97)
M (SD) M (SD)
Anger 2.53 (1.17)a 1.07 (0.36)b
95% CI [2.29, 2.76] 95% CI [1.00, 1.14]
Compensation 40.0% 3.1%
Punishment 7.4% 0%
Self 52.6% 96.9%
χ2(2, N = 192) = 50.31, p < 0.001
Anger scores could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means with a different superscript differ
significantly from each other, t(111.51) = 11.63, p < 0.001
Participants in the equity condition read the same scenario, but here Mark decided
to give Rick e50 and keep e50. Next, as an emotion check, participants indicated
how much anger, shame, regret, pride, and guilt they would feel (1 = not at all, 5 =
very strongly).
Then, participants read that they owned e50 and they could choose to compensate
Rick or punish Mark, or keep all the money themselves. In the case of choosing pun-
ishment or compensation, participants also indicated how many euros they would
spend (Every euro used would de/increase the other’s amount with e3). Finally,
participants were thanked, debriefed, and received e8 or course credit for their par-
ticipation.
5.2 Results
The results are displayed in Table 2. The other emotion means are in the Appendix.
Participants in the inequity condition reported more anger than their counterparts in
the equity condition, and they reported more anger than all other emotions. Partici-
pants in the inequity condition punished Mark and compensated Rick more often than
participants in the equity condition. Most equity participants chose to keep the money.
When we only consider participants who were confronted with inequity and chose to
not keep their entire money, results show that they opted more often for compensation
(84%) than punishment (16%),5 χ2(1, N = 45) = 21.36, p < 0.001.
5.3 Discussion
These results show that participants that become angry after inequity prefer compen-
sation to punishment, whereas such a preference is absent in the equity condition.
5 Due to the low number of participants choosing for punishment, we were not able to compare the amount
of money used for compensation and punishment.
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Together, these studies support our hypothesis that third-party anger can elicit proso-
cial behavior aimed at the victim and to a preference for prosocial behavior over
antagonistic behavior in order to restore equity.
Importantly, however, our studies did not rely on actual behavior with some level of
consequence. Put differently, our studies were not properly incentivized. To provide
final support for our hypothesis, Study 3 provides a direct measure of behavior by
inviting participants to actually use their monetary endowment for third-party inter-
ventions to increase the trade-off between keeping money to take home or using it
for justice-related behavior. Therefore, it provides an objective and clear behavioral
measure that indicates if participants are willing to sacrifice their own resources for
the sake of re-dressing the injustice and whether that takes the form of punishment or
compensation (or some combination of the two).
6 Study 3
6.1 Method
German university students (36 males, 52 females; Mage = 23.14, SD = 2.81) par-
ticipated in an experimental game. We tested their willingness to engage in costly
third-party interventions using a modified altruistic intervention paradigm (see Lotz
et al. 2011a, b; Fehr and Gächter 2002). Upon arriving, participants were told that
they had been randomly assigned to the role of “Person C” in a study involving three
anonymous strangers. They were told that Person B had been initially allocated e10,
but that Person A was given the opportunity to redistribute that e10 to him/herself
and Person B (i.e., to take some or all money away from Person B). Participants were
told that Person A had taken the entire e10, leaving nothing to Person B. After our
participants learnt about the unfair behavior of Person A, we assessed their anger,
amongst other emotions (1 = not at all, 5 = very much).
Participants were then given their own endowment of e5 in cash using coins of
various denomination. It was explained to them that, if they wanted, they could real-
locate their initial endowment to punish the offender, compensate the victim, some
combination of the two, or to keep it for themselves (i.e., they could keep any money
they chose not reallocated to punishment or compensation). Punitive and compensatory
actions were made more efficient (consistent with experimental games involving actual
behavior, e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2002) so that each e0.50 reallocation resulted in a
e1 consequence (e.g., e1.50 punishment allocation yielded in a loss for Person A of
e3).
6.2 Results
The results are summarized in Table 3. Emotion means are displayed in the Appendix.
In total, out of 88 participants 22 did not use any money for re-allocation, 4 only
punished Person A, 28 only compensated Person B, and 34 punished Person A as well
as compensated Person B. Thus, a total of 66 participants (75%) engaged in at least
one justice response. On average, participants usede0.75 (SD = 1.13) for punishment
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Table 3 Study 3: percentages
of monetary division and
reported anger
Participants who chose… n
…compensation only 28
…punishment only 4
…compensation and punishment 34
…no justice response 22
and e1.14 (SD = 1.17) for compensation. Thus, consistent with the previous studies,
compensation seems the preferred option. Furthermore, we found a positive relation-
ship of anger and third-party interventions. That is, the total amount of money used for
third-party interventions significantly correlated with anger, r (88) = 0.32, p = 0.001.
In sum, this behavioral study replicated and augmented the previous results and
suggests that third-party interventions follow experiences of anger. As in previous
research, compensation was a preferred option, allowing the conclusion that anger can
function as a prosocial emotion associated with the willingness to engage in costly
third-party behavior.
7 General discussion
We examined prosocial consequences of third-party anger. In Study 1, we found that
autobiographical recalls of anger spill over to new situations and cause participants
to act more prosocially in triadic situations. Interestingly, these effects could not be
explained by trait anger and trait empathy. Study 2 elaborated on that and revealed
that people angry about a triadic situation of inequity prefer compensation of a victim
to punishment of a perpetrator. Finally, Study 3 provides behavioral evidence that
people are willing to give up money in order to compensate others, who have been
unfairly treated. This willingness was correlated with experiences of anger elicited by
this unfair treatment.
These findings add to the existing literature in that they are the first to show when
anger motivates people to compensate or act prosocially towards the victim. We think
that these prosocial consequences of anger have been overlooked in previous studies
on the negative consequences of anger because these focused on dyadic situations
where the participant is the victim. Only in triadic situations when a person observes
an inequity can we observe prosocial behavior following from anger. When people
themselves are victims of inequity, we primarily see antagonistic behavior because
there is simply no victim to be compensated (unless one could compensate oneself).
An additional reason for having overlooked prosocial consequences of anger could
be the dominant theoretical focus on negative consequences of anger, most notably
punishment. Previous studies that did look at positive or prosocial effects of anger
were mainly correlational in nature, were inconsistent in the operationalization of
anger (e.g., Iyer et al. 2007; Montada and Schneider 1989; Wakslak et al. 2007),
lacked a simultaneous measure of both compensatory and punitive measures (as in
third-party punishment studies), or the compensatory and punitive measures were
not costly (e.g., Adams and Mullen 2014). Finally, studies that did include positive
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consequences typically did not directly measure situational, state anger. For example,
Leliveld et al. (2012) and Prooijen (2010) looked at prosocial consequences after
injustice but did not include a measurement of anger. Deffenbacher et al. (1996)
showed a positive correlation between trait anger and aggressive consequences, and
Vitaglione and Barnett (2003) showed that there was no direct relation between trait
empathic anger and helping or punishing. As has been shown for other emotions, such
as shame, trait measures tend to yield different results than state measures of emotion
(e.g., De Hooge et al. 2008). Effect of trait anger show what people do who are easily
angered or who experience anger often. Effects of state anger show what people do
who are actually angry about a specific situation.
By showing that anger has prosocial consequences we do not propose that anger is a
prosocial emotion, neither do we suggest that there are two different forms of anger, or
that anger leads to a general tendency to act prosocial to anyone or in every situation.
Instead, we merely argue that there are situational distinctions in the experience of
anger allowing for certain behaviors to emerge. Prosocial behavior can only emerge
when there is room for compensatory behavior towards the victim and not only puni-
tive behavior towards the perpetrator (as reflected in the difference between triadic
situations and dyadic situations). Furthermore, as discussed previously and revealed
in our studies, the positive effects of anger cannot be explained by simultaneous expe-
riences of trait empathic concern. One could argue that state empathic concern might
influence prosocial consequences above and beyond state anger. However, if so we
would predict more compensation in the control condition of Study 1 as well, which
was not the case.
In addition to finding a direct relation between anger and prosocial behavior, we
also found that angry people prefer compensation to punishment. Compensation could
be seen as a more efficient form of restoring equity than punishment is, as it allows for
getting the victim out of its disadvantageous position. Punishment, on the other hand,
only lowers the perpetrator’s position to that of the victim, but does not do anything
for the victim. However, there is also a possibility that people prefer compensation
to punishment due to relational concerns. In contrast to punishment, compensation
allows for investing in a relationship with the victim. Future research might reveal the
exact motivation behind this preference.
Taken together, we sought to comprehend the behavioral effects of anger, and
how situational factors decide why anger leads to antagonistic behavior towards the
perpetrator or prosocial behavior towards the victim. These studies suggest that the
behaviors stemming from anger, be it antagonistic or prosocial, are a situation-specific
reaction to inequity.
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Appendix
Emotion manipulation checks of Studies 1–3 (Tables 4, 5, 6)
Table 4 Study 1: means (and standard deviations) of emotions experienced as a function of condition
Emotions Condition
Anger (n = 63) Control (n = 59)
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI
Anger 3.67 (0.92)a [3.44, 3.90] 1.29 (0.74)b [1.09, 1.48]
Guilt 1.67 (1.03)a [1.41,1.93] 1.24 (0.60)b [1.08, 1.39]
Shame 1.89 (1.06)a [1.62, 2.16] 1.29 (0.70)b [1.11, 1.47]
Regret 2.08 (1.22)a [1.77, 2.39] 1.42 (0.79)b [1.22, 1.63]
Sadness 2.57 (1.36)a [2.23, 2.92] 1.25 (0.71)b [1.07, 1.44]
Happiness 1.25 (0.62)a [1.10, 1.41] 3.29 (0.95)b [3.04, 3.54]
Emotions could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means with a different superscript differ
significantly with all ts > 2.84, ps < 0.006. Means in bold represent the dominant emotion experienced
within that condition, with all ts > 8.12, ps < 0.001 in the anger condition, and with all ts > 10.36, ps <
0.001 in the control condition
Table 5 Study 2: means (and standard deviations) of emotions experienced as a function of condition
Emotions Condition
Inequity (n = 95) Equity (n = 97)
M (SD) 95% CI M (SD) 95% CI
Anger 2.53 (1.17)a [2.29, 2.76] 1.07 (0.36)b [1.00, 1.14]
Guilt 2.05 (1.20)a [1.81, 2.30] 1.26 (0.70)b [1.12, 1.40]
Shame 1.67 (1.02)a [1.47, 1.88] 1.22 (0.56)b [1.10, 1.33]
Regret 1.53 (0.85)a [1.35, 1.70] 1.39 (0.76)a [1.24, 1.54]
Pride 1.36 (0.74)a [1.21, 1.51] 2.81 (1.32)b [2.55, 3.08]
Emotions could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means with a different superscript differ
significantly with all ts > 3.85, ps < 0.001. Means in bold represent the dominant emotion experienced
within that condition, with all ts > 2.84, ps < 0.005 in the anger condition, and with all ts > 10.80, ps <
0.001 in the control condition
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Table 6 Study 3: means (and standard deviations) of emotions experienced as a consequence of the
presented injustice
Experimental game (n = 88)
Emotions M (SD) 95% CI
Anger 2.42 (1.22) [2.16, 2.68]
Guilt 1.27 (0.66) [1.13, 1.41]
Shame 1.73 (1.00) [1.51, 1.94]
Fear 1.19 (0.50) [1.08, 1.29]
Pride 1.34 (0.86) [1.16, 1.52]
Emotions could range from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strongly). Means in bold represent the dominant emotion
experienced within that condition in comparison to emotions collected in the previous studies, with all ts >
5.76, ps < 0.001. Study 4 included a longer list of emotions that served as filler items, which is disclosed
here. These additional emotions were active (M = 2.24, SD = 1.22), distressed (M = 2.48, SD = 1.08),
interested (M = 3.00, SD = 1.09), happy (M = 1.49, SD = 0.84), strong (M = 2.24, SD = 1.20), shocked
(M = 2.05, SD = 1.24), hostile (M = 1.81, SD = 1.08), stimulated (M = 2.27, SD = 1.07), aggravated
(M = 1.86, SD = 0.98), enthusiastic (M = 1.25, SD = 0.65), awake (M = 2.93, SD = 1.20), nervous (M
= 1.67, SD = 1.00), determined (M = 2.75, SD = 1.22), attentive (M = 3.25, SD = 1.07), and confused
(M = 1.85, SD = 1.19)
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